Trade policy, industrial policy, and the exchange rate by Dohner, Robert S. & Intal  Ponciano
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume
3: Country Studies - Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey
Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-30455-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/sach89-2
Conference Date: September 21-23, 1987
Publication Date: 1989
Chapter Title: Trade Policy, Industrial Policy, and the Exchange Rate
Chapter Author: Robert S. Dohner, Ponciano Intal, Jr.
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9049
Chapter pages in book: (p. 433 - 460)
433 PhilippineKhapter 3 
became more of a way of assuring foreign currency inflows than a means of 
creating capital stock. New projects were started as late as 1983, despite 
delays and stretch-outs of existing projects due to the inability of the 
government to come up with counterpart funds. Current expenditure, 
particularly operations and maintenance expenditures, were cut back to 
sustain investment, in some cases prematurely retiring the existing capital 
stock. 
Finally, the Philippines shifted the public sector deficit from the national 
government to public corporations and later to government financial 
institutions and the central bank, using the borrowing ability of each to keep 
the system afloat, until the process could no longer be sustained. 
3 Trade Policy, Industrial Policy, 
and the Exchange Rate 
Trade and industrialization policy have been the vortex of Philippine eco- 
nomic debate. Trade policy has been more extensively argued in the 
Philippines than has any other economic policy, starting with the outcry over 
the administration of the import control program in the early 1950s and 
extending through the current debates on import liberalization. This 
prominence is reflected in research on the Philippine economy, and there is 
now an extensive literature on Philippine trade and industrial policy. Trade 
policy issues are also central to our analysis of the Philippine debt crisis. In 
comparative studies of LDC borrowers, the extent to which exports grew 
appears to play a key role in determining whether or not countries were 
forced to reschedule.2 In the Philippines in particular, trade and industrial 
policy were powerful forces behind the slide of the economy into crisis in the 
1980s. 
Despite the importance given to industrial and trade policy, Philippine 
industrial and trade performance has been largely disappointing. The initial 
period of import substitution led to rapid economic growth in the early 
1950s. However, in what has now become a classic pattern of import 
substitution, growth slowed as the industries that were created reached the 
limits of the domestic market and as their high dependence on imports of 
capital goods and intermediates meant that the growth of the economy as a 
whole was limited by recurrent balance of payments crises. The Philippines 
went through an import decontrol program in the early 1960s, but with 
disappointing results. Economic growth remained sluggish, particularly in 
the manufacturing sector, and the country failed to develop significant new 
export industries. 
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For much of the 1970s it appeared that the Philippines had achieved a 
decisive break with its past. The Marcos martial law government was 
outwardly strongly export promoting and actively encouraged investment, 
both domestic and foreign, in export industries. Philippine export growth in 
the seventies was quite respectable, averaging 8.6 percent per year in 
volume. But what was more striking was the transformation in the export 
structure of the country that took place over this period. In the 1960s the 
Philippines was overwhelmingly dependent on commodities+oconut 
products, sugar, forest products, copper, and gold-for its export earning, as 
we point out in table 3.1. At the beginning of the 1970s these four product 
categories alone accounted for 76 percent of Philippine exports; by the end 
of the decade, their share had fallen to 46 percent. In their place was a group 
of nontraditional products, particularly electrical components and garments. 
For most of the decade, manufactured exports had increased by over 30 
percent per year (de Vries 1980, 5). 
But despite this success in diversification and the rapid growth of 
manufactured exports, in aggregate Philippine exports were still problem- 
atic. In table 3.2 we present a comparison of export shares in GDP for the 
Philippines and neighboring Asian countries. While the Philippines starts out 
in a large group with a low export to GDP share, the ratio never changes 
over the course of the decade, in contrast to the other countries listed in the 
table. In fact, the sluggishness of the Philippine export share is worse than is 
indicated in table 3.2. The structural transformation that took place during 
the decade shifted Philippine exports toward goods characterized by low 
margins of domestic value added and high import requirements. As a result, 
the growth in domestic value added, or alternately, the net foreign exchange 
generating capacity of the export sector, was much less than suggested by 
the growth of exports. A rough correction for this effect is shown in the 
Table 3.1 Share in Total Merchandise Exports (percentages) 
Exports 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1986 1987 
Coconut products 
Sugar products 
Logs, lumber & plywood 
Copper and gold 
Suhlotal 
Pineapple and bananas 
Electncal equipment and 
Garments 
Other nontraditional 
Others 
components 
manufactures 
34.0 18.6 20.3 14.0 13.5 9.7 9.2 
18.5 17.2 26.9 11.4 6.1 2.2 I .0 
22.7 24.2 9.4 6.6 4.1 5.2 3.9 
5.9 16.2 12.6 13.5 - 4.1 - 4.8 - 4.8 
- 81.1 76.2 69.2 45.5 28.4 21.9 19.0 
- -
I .8 2.5 5.0 3.6 4.4 5.3 N.A. 
- - 2.0 11.6 24.7 18.7 19.6 
- - 4.4 8.6 1 1 . 1  15.5 19.2 
5.8 10.9 11.5 16.2 21.9 21.3 24.9 
11.3 10.4 7.9 14.5 9.5 17.3 N.A. 
Source: NEDA, Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1987; and IMF (1988b). 
Note: N.A. indicates data were not available, and a dash means that the amount was negligible 
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Table 3.2 Merchandise Export Shares in GDP (in percentages) 
1970 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 
Philippines 15.1 18.6 14.2 14.2 16.4 12.6 16.7 15.6 
Indonesia 12.7 28.8 22.9 22.6 33.0 21.9 24.5 19.1 
Korea 10.1 24.1 27.0 25.4 28.1 28.8 30.8 34.5 
Malaysia 41.3 43.8 47.5 46.7 54.0 44.6 48.3 49.3 
Thailand 10.5 18.1 17.9 17.5 19.3 18.6 20.2 20.6 
Philippines 
Memo items: 
Exports net of con- 
signment imports 15.1 17.7 12.6 12.4 14.0 10.3 12.5 N.A. 
Service exports" 2.6 3.5 3.0 4.6 4.7 5.9 6.3 N.A. 
Sources: Philippines: Central bank and National Census and Statistical Office. Others: Asian Development 
Bank, Key Indicarors of Developing Member Countries. 1986. 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
'Net of interest receipts and government service exports (including U S .  base receipts). 
second to last row of the table, which compares Philippine merchandise 
exports, net of consignment imports, to GDP. This ratio declines 
significantly over the decade. As a result of this export sector narrowing, the 
Philippines was left in a more difficult position from which to adjust to an 
adverse external shock. 
The last line in table 3.2 illustrates a factor that sets the Philippines apart 
from most LDC debtors. Service exports were an important and increasing 
source of foreign exchange earning over the 1970s and 1980s. Most of this 
came from overseas labor earnings in construction, nursing, and domestic 
work, and this source increased in the 1980s as more Filipinos sought 
overseas employment. 
Of course, Philippine trade policy affected the entire allocation of 
domestic resources and not just the export sector. Trade policy and also 
investment incentives have had a particularly strong impact on the Philippine 
manufacturing sector, a sector whose history has been puzzling and 
ultimately disappointing. In contrast to other countries in East and Southeast 
Asia, the manufacturing sector has not been a leading sector in the growth of 
the economy (table 3.3). 
Philippine manufacturing grew rapidly in the early 1950s under the 
impetus of import protection. But once the initial burst of import substitution 
played out, output growth slowed considerably. Nor was the sector revived 
by the decontrol episode in the early 1960s. Manufacturing growth fell 
behind that of the economy as a whole, profits were low, and excess capacity 
and competition led to rising nationalist sentiments. The manufacturing 
sector recovered in the latter part of the decade, and in the early 1970s it 
appeared that the Philippines might have broken the dependence of the sector 
on the growth of the domestic economy, with a rapid growth of 
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Table 3.3 Comparative GDP and Manufacturing Growth 
Philippines Indonesia Malaysia Thailand Korea 
Real GDP Growth 
1965 - 70 
1970-75 
1975-80 
1980-83 
1965- 70 
1970-75 
I975 - 80 
1980-83 
1963-70 
1970-75 
1975-80 
1980-83 
Manufacturing value added 
Manufacturing employment 
5.0 
6.2 
6.2 
2.6 
6.9 
6.9 
6.0 
2.7 
2.9 
2.9 
4.1 
3.5 
6.2 
7.6 
7.9 
5.0" 
7.8 
9.6 
15.0 
N.A. 
4.9 
4.8 
4.2 
13.4" 
N.A. 
7.4 
8.6 
6.4 
13.9 
12.3 
11.3 
N.A. 
16.3 
6.6 
0.0 
0.5 
8.6 
6.3 
7.6 
5.4 
10.2 
10.3 
10.5 
6.0 
5.1 
4.5 
5.7 
1 .o 
10.4 
9.5 
7.5 
8.0 
22. I 
19.7 
14.8 
7.9 
10.7 
15.2 
6.2 
3.3 
Sources: World Bank (1979). table I .2: Asian Development Bank, Key lndicarors of Developing Member 
Countries; and IME International Financial Sfafistics. 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
"1980-82 
nontraditional manufactured exports and a growth rate for the sector well in 
excess of that of domestic GDP (table 3.4). 
But the growth of manufacturing was not sustained, and a closer look 
reveals serious weaknesses in the sector. The most glaring weakness is its 
productivity performance. A recent study of manufacturing productivity 
concluded that total factor productivity in the sectorfell by 1.23 percent per 
year over the 1970s. The decline was more rapid in the last half of the 
decade, when total factor productivity fell by almost 2 percent per year.3 The 
poor productivity performance for manufacturing is an obvious candidate for 
explaining a problem mentioned in the introductory chapter, the high 
investment requirement of Philippine output growth. In comparison to other 
developing countries, both inside and outside the region, the Philippines 
invested more to grow less. 
The second difficulty with the manufacturing sector was its inability to 
generate significant employment, in spite of the rapid growth of labor- 
intensive manufactured exports. The share of manufacturing in total 
Philippine employment actually peaked at 12 percent in 1956, and has 
remained just under that level in the period since. Again, this is in contrast to 
other countries in the region, where the manufacturing sector has played a 
lead in employment growth (see table 3.3). 
Finally, the output expansion in the manufacturing sector as a whole 
proved extremely fragile. The rate of output growth in manufacturing hit a 
peak in 1977 and then declined steadily through 1985. Manufacturing and 
the investments that had been made in the 1970s proved extremely 
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Table 3.4 Philippine Sectoral Growth Rates 
Sector 1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-87 
Agriculture 7.1 2.9 4.8 3.5 4.3 5.3 0.5 2.0 
Manufacturing 12. I 7.7 4.5 6. I 6.9 6.0 -2.7 2.8 
Services 9.0 5.1 4.5 4.8 5.7 5.7 0.8 4.7 
Domestic 
product" 7.9 4.6 4.8 5.0 6.2 6.2 - 1.2 3.3 
Source: NEDA, National Income Accounts of the Philippines. 
*Net domestic product 1950-70, gross domestic product 1970-85 
vulnerable to the rise in oil prices and real interest rates in the early 1980s 
and to the accompanying international recession. Many of the industries that 
were developed in the 1970s saw massive drops in output in the 1980s. 
Thus an analysis of the impact of trade and industrial policy has a large 
amount of ground to cover. Two critical and puzzling questions stand out. 
The first is the failure to shift resources toward the traded goods sector and 
the apparent export shallowing of the Philippine economy, despite the 
transformation of export structure that took place. The second is the inability 
to generate faster output and employment growth in manufacturing, and the 
weakness of the sector during the 1980s. 
Four elements of Philippine trade, exchange rate, and industrial policy 
provide the explanation. The first is the structure of trade protection and 
incentives, which encouraged indiscriminate and inefficient import substitu- 
tion. The second is the country's exchange rate policy, which has been 
characterized by delayed responses to payments disequilibrium, thereby 
hurting export industries, dampening export diversification, and discourag- 
ing backward linkages. Third, direct interventions by the government in the 
traditional agricultural export sector during the 1970s not only penalized that 
sector but also exacerbated its problems in the face of a highly volatile world 
price environment. And fourth, there was an expansion of government- 
controlled and government-associated corporations and with it, a tendency 
toward centralization and politicization of economic decision making during 
the 1970s. This chapter examines the first two factors; the next chapter 
discusses the last two. 
3.1 Trade Policy and the Structure of Protection 
Philippine trade policy and the industrial policy that grew out of it were 
more products of the response to crisis and the limited policy choices that the 
Philippines had under the Bell Act than they were conscious attempts to 
promote developmental goals. But once the trade policy regime was 
established in the 1950s, it quickly became the cornerstone of the country's 
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industrialization policy and rapidly developed a constituency concerned with 
its preservation. 
The Philippines had suffered extensive damage during the Second World 
War, and in the late 1940s there were huge expenditure demands for 
reconstruction, which led to a rapid increase in imports. In addition, after the 
substantial wartime inflation, the prewar exchange rate of 2 pesos/dollar was 
unrealistically high, further increasing import demand. Exports recovered 
somewhat, aided by a rise in export prices, but payments balance was 
maintained largely through transfers from the United States. These payments 
for relief, veteran’s pensions, and military expenditure totaled almost $300 
million in the period 1946-50 and covered over half of Philippine  import^.^ 
A large increase in public spending during the 1948 election campaign and 
the impending reduction of U.S. aid payments led to a balance of payments 
crisis. In December 1949 the eleven-month-old central bank initiated foreign 
exchange controls. 
Foreign exchange controls were followed by legislation in 1950 that 
required licenses for all imports, allocated by an Import Control Board. 
Commodities were grouped by degree of “essentiality.” The most stringent 
controls were imposed on nonessential consumer goods (i.e., luxuries and 
consumer durables) and the least stringent on essential consumer goods 
(e.g., pharmaceuticals, milk products) and essential producer goods (most 
machinery, fertilizer, fuels and lubricants). Domestic prices for the most 
heavily restricted imports rose sharply, leading to investment and production 
in a variety of consumer goods industries. 
While the balance of payments crisis was the initial motive for import 
controls, industrial promotion rapidly became the rationale of the protective 
system as a domestic import-substituting industrial sector developed and 
economic growth, led by manufacturing, accelerated in the early 1950s. The 
industrialists who emerged would become a powerful lobby for import 
restriction in future policy debates, and the import-substituting strategy 
established in the 1950s would persist, largely unchanged, until the 1980s. 
The Philippine experience with import controls was typical of that of a 
number of LDCs. Domestic entrepreneurs responded quickly to profitable 
opportunities created by import restrictions, and manufacturing output grew 
rapidly. The share of consumer goods in imports dropped sharply, as the 
import pattern shifted toward raw materials and capital goods. However, the 
rapid growth of manufacturing in the early 1950s did not persist, and output 
growth became much more sluggish in the latter half of the decade. 
Philippine tariff policy follows a parallel history. In the years immediately 
after independence, the Philippines was severely limited in its ability to 
impose and collect tariffs. Seventy percent of Philippine imports came from 
the United States, and the country was bound under the Bell Act to a very 
gradual schedule of implementing tariffs on these imports. The transition 
period was substantially shortened with the revised trade agreement between 
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the United States and the Philippines in 1955 (the Laurel-Langley 
Agreement), which permitted 25 percent of Philippine tariffs to be applied to 
imports from the United States in 1956, 50 percent in 1959, and 75 percent 
in 1962. The Philippines introduced a revised system of tariffs in 1957 that 
duplicated the protective system established by the import control program, 
with the highest duties on nonessential consumer goods. While the tariffs 
were redundant as protective measures, they did succeed in siphoning off 
some of the rents that had been created by the import control program. 
The import control program itself had a rocky history. The initial surge in 
import prices led to the adoption of price controls for a variety of basic 
commodities. The import premium, as measured by the ratio of the black 
market to the official exchange rate, averaged 60 percent and reached 100 
percent by the end of the decade. Charges of corruption and mismanagement 
dogged the import licensing process, even after authority for import control 
had been shifted to the central bank. By the end of the decade, pressure from 
the sugar bloc in Congress, continuing dissatisfaction with the corruption of 
the control system, slowing economic growth, and growing evasion of the 
exchange control system by exporters led the Philippines to dismantle the 
system of import control. Decontrol took place over a three-year period; by 
1962 the peso had been devalued to P. 3.9 per dollar and licensing require- 
ments for imports had been removed. 
The impetus behind decontrol was largely reaction to the graft involved in 
the import control system and the feeling that exporters had been able to 
evade foreign exchange surrender requirements, rather than a conscious 
attempt to diminish the extent of protection of domestic industry and shift 
resources toward the exporting sector. In order to protect domestic industry 
from the effects of decontrol, the Philippine government raised duties on 
roughly 700 items, and further increases in tariffs followed (Baldwin 1975, 
57). In addition, the share of Philippine duties applicable to imports from the 
United States under the Laurel-Langley agreement jumped from 50 percent 
to 75 percent in 1962, significantly raising duties on the large majority of 
Philippine imports. 
Even with the rise in tariff rates, the elimination of import licensing 
significantly lowered the degree of protection afforded to import-competing 
industries. Despite the rise of f.0.b. peso import prices by 101 percent from 
1959 to 1962, the wholesale price index of imported goods rose only 22 
percent. Measurements done by Baldwin (1975, 58, 100) indicate that the 
smallest price increases occurred for the most heavily restricted goods. 
However, despite the change in relative prices, decontrol does not appear to 
have led to industrial restructuring nor to the emergence of new industries 
geared toward exports. Manufacturing output growth slowed significantly in 
the wake of decontrol, as indicated in table 3.4. The slowdown was spread 
across all sectors of manufacturing, and there is little evidence of any 
structural change in this p e r i ~ d . ~  Manufacturing exports increased, but not 
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dramatically, and not enough to raise the sector’s growth rate. Manufacturing 
profits in general fell after 1961. Industry groups, particularly the Philippine 
Chamber of Industry, became more vocal in their complaints about excess 
capacity and competition and in their demands for support of existing 
Philippine Protests against foreign investment increased, and 
economic nationalism became a more potent force in the 1960s. 
In contrast, the fortunes of the traditional export sector increased 
dramatically in the decontrol period; from 1959 to 1963 the wholesale price 
index for export goods increased by 20 percent relative to the index for local 
manufactures. The output response of the traditional sector was swift, 
although measuring the effect is complicated by the underreporting of 
exports in the late 1950s and by the increase in the U.S. sugar quota in 
1962. Even with corrections for these effects, exports increased by about 50 
percent in dollar terms from 1959 to 1966.’ Afterward, the rate of export 
growth slowed considerably, averaging only 1.5 percent between 1966 and 
1969. 
An additional effect of the rise in the relative price of traditional exports 
was to switch agricultural land from food production to the production of 
export crops. The result was a rapid rise in domestic prices of foodstuffs, in 
addition to the inflation resulting from the exchange rate depreciation. This 
in turn led to a general drop in real wages. The food price inflation and the 
decline in urban real wages were the most politically sensitive of the 
decontrol outcomes, and they spawned domestic protests, particularly in 
1963. 
The prevailing opinion of the decontrol period in the Philippines was one 
of disappointment. Filipinos viewed the early 1960s as a period of relative 
stagnation, excess capacity, rising prices, and falling real wages. The failure 
of the decontrol period to spur economic growth weakened the ground of 
economic liberals, and would shift their attention to export promotion, 
without trying to change the existing incentives for resource allocation. 
Finally, the decontrol experience produced a more favorable view toward 
economic planning and government market interventions. An outgrowth of 
this sentiment was the enactment of a comprehensive system of industrial 
incentives in 1967, as well as a financial facility for distressed firms set up at 
DBP in 1966. The Philippine government also intervened more actively in 
allocating resources among industries after the decontrol episode. The Board 
of Investments (BOI) that was established by the Industrial Incentives Act of 
1967 had substantial discretion in administering the incentives, as well as the 
authority to limit investments in industries with excess capacity. 
The latter half of the 1960s saw more rapid growth and a recovery of the 
manufacturing sector, produced by the expansionary policies of the Marcos 
government. As the balance of payments worsened, there was a gradual 
reintroduction of exchange controls. But the Philippines did not return to 
comprehensive import controls before, or during, the payments crisis of 
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1970. The IMF stabilization program called for a depreciation of the peso, 
and the Philippine economy recovered rapidly in the early 1970s. One of the 
first economic policy measures of the martial law government was a tariff 
reform program in 1973, which was designed to limit the number of tariff 
rate categories and lower the dispersion among tariff rates. This was a tariff 
reform in only a limited sense. The 1973 tariff program increased the 
average tariff rate by 3 to 4 percent, and maintained the cascading structure 
of the Philippine tariff system (ILO 1974, 113). The tariffs established at this 
time remained until the early 1980s. 
The structure of protection, as indicated by the sector or end-user 
estimates of effective rates of protection and by the average effective 
exchange rate, is presented in table 3.5. Because of the limited ability to 
impose or collect tariffs under the terms of the Bell Act, the Philippines 
developed a system of domestic sales taxation, differentiated by product and, 
in some cases, by domestic or foreign origin. The estimates of the effective 
Table 3.5 Philippine Protection 
A. Effective Protection Rate 
I965 I974 
All sectors 
Exports 
Sugar 
Nonexportables 
Import competing 
Import noncompetingb 
Agriculture and primary 
Manufacturing 
Capital goods 
Intermediate goods 
Inputs for construction 
Consumer goods 
48 
- 19" 
183 
59' 
83' 
I04 
51 
16 
27 
55 
70 
36 
4 
37 
I48 
9 
44 
23 
16 
77 
18 
28 
12 
35 
67 
3 
36 
25 
33 
31 
42 
B. Average Effective Exchange Rate (pesos/dollar) 
1950-59 1960-69 1970-80 
Traditional exports 2.00 3.46 6.60 
Essential consumer imports 2.06 3.91 8.12 
Nonessential consumer imports 3.64 10.55 25.48 
New exports 2.30 3.70 7.99 
Sources: Power and Sicat (1971). Tan (1979), Baldwin (1975). and Senga (1983). 
"Excluding sugar 
bManufacturing sector only 
'Import noncompeting industries are those in which imports amount to less than 10 percent of domestic 
production. 
'kighted average of Power and Sicat's estimates for agriculture (17 percent), forestry ( - 26 percent), and 
mining ( -  17 percent). 
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rates of protection, which were drawn from Tan (1979) and Power and Sicat 
(1971), take into consideration the differential protective effect of these 
domestic product taxes. 
An alternative estimate of sector protection is the effective exchange rate, 
the number of units of domestic currency actually paid or received per dollar 
in a given transaction. These were computed by Baldwin (1975) and Senga 
(1983), and include the effects of multiple exchange rates, tariffs and export 
taxes, discriminatory domestic sales taxes, subsidized borrowing rates, and 
margin deposit requirements. 
Both measures are shown in table 3.5. During the 1960s and 1970s the 
highest effective rates of protection were given to the import-substituting 
consumer goods industries (primarily the nonessential consumer goods 
according to the central bank's classification system). The table also 
indicates the much lower protection given to exports and to the agricultural 
and primary sectors. The estimates in table 3.5 show that, despite the 
revisions in the tariff code in 1973, the general pattern in the structure of 
protection remained the same during the 1970s. 
This conclusion is strengthened when the effects of tariff exemptions 
during the 1970s are included. Soon after the 1973 tariff reform, duty 
exemption privileges were granted to a number of public institutions and 
private enterprises. During the martial law period these exemptions became 
more widespread. The ratio of estimated duty exemptions to actual duties 
paid on all imports reached at least 22 percent during the latter 1970s from 
the 9 percent level during 1973-74 (Alburo and Shepherd 1986, 60). These 
duty exemptions were mostly on capital and raw material imports. Thus, the 
effective rate of protection overstates the protection given to capital goods 
industries and understates the actual protection given to consumer goods 
industries. 
Despite the professed aim of the martial law government to revamp the 
system of incentives and encourage exports, Philippine trade policy 
remained firmly committed to encouraging production for the domestic 
market. Among countries in Southeast Asia, only Indonesia provided a 
higher effective rate of protection to imports relative to that given to exports 
(table 3.6). 
This orientation of trade policy was reinforced in the 1970s by nontariff 
barriers. Nontariff barriers had been the principal means of industrial 
protection during the 1950s, but were deemphasized during the 1960s as part 
of the decontrol program. The 1970s and 1980s saw their increasing use, for 
reasons of balance of payments adjustment, industry protection, support of 
local content programs, safeguarding of public health and national security, 
and centralizing of importation.' Nontariff barriers paralleled the structure of 
protection of the tariff system; by 1977, 62 percent of all consumer good 
items were regulated, as compared to 24 percent of mineral fuels and 
lubricants, 23 percent of intermediate goods, and 17 percent of capital 
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Table 3.6 Effective Rates of Protection, Selected Southeast Asian Countries 
Country Year Exportables Importables Total Manufacturing 
Philippines I974 
Indonesia 1975 
Malaysia 1978 
Singapore 1979 
Thailand 1980 
4 
-6  13 
4 
24 
61 
98 
53 
1 
89 
44 
39 
34 
3 
65 
Source: Findlay and Gamaut (1986, xix). 
Note: Effective rates of protection weighted by value added. Industries are classified by whether net exports 
are positive or negative. 
goods.’ Although tariff rates stayed constant after the 1973 tariff revision, 
the increase in nontariff measures raised the average level of effective 
protection given to domestic industry in the 1970s and increased the 
variability of protection across industries. 
3.2 Fiscal Incentives and Export Promotion 
The granting of fiscal incentives has been an important tool of industrial 
promotion in the Philippines since independence. Several laws granting fiscal 
incentives for investments in priority industries were enacted, with some 
modifications over time in their nature, mechanics, and industry coverage. 
The incentives initially took the form of exemptions from domestic taxes, 
but broadened over time to include exemptions from customs duties 
(especially on imported capital equipment and parts), tax deductions, and 
tax credits. At the same time, the granting of fiscal incentives, initially 
indiscriminate, became somewhat more defined with the passage of the 
Investment Incentives Act of 1967 and the subsequent establishment of the 
BOI. Nonetheless, there was a high degree of continuity among the incentive 
recipients; most of the firms that benefitted during the 1960s were the same 
ones that benefitted from fiscal incentives during the 1950s (Power and Sicat 
The Investment Incentives Act of 1967 and the Export Incentives Act of 
1970 provided the framework for fiscal incentives during the 1970s. The 
Industrial Incentives Act distinguished two priority sectors: “preferred” 
industries, where existing capacity was considered to be smaller than what 
the domestic market and likely export potential could support, and 
“pioneer” industries, which would introduce new products or processes to 
the Philippines. Investments in preferred industries by registered firms 
benefitted from accelerated depreciation, tax exemptions on imported capital 
equipment, and tax credits on the purchase of domestic capital equipment. 
Pioneer industry investments were eligible for the same benefits, as well as 
exemptions from all internal revenue taxes except the corporate income tax. 
1971, 79-82). 
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In addition, firms in pioneer industries could be wholly foreign-owned, 
while the maximum foreign ownership for registered firms in preferred 
industries was 40 percent. The act also allowed exporters access to inputs at 
world market prices by providing a tax credit for import taxes paid. 
The act established the BOI, attached to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, to identify priority sectors through its Investment Priorities Plan, 
process applications, and administer the incentives. In addition, the BOI was 
given authority to limit investment in “overcrowded industries,” an 
outgrowth of the complaints over excess capacity and competition during the 
decontrol period. 
Support for exporters was liberalized and extended by the Export 
Incentives Act of 1970, which gave registered exporting firms tax and duty 
free imports of capital equipment, tax deductions for various business 
development expenses, and duty drawbacks on imported intermediate goods. 
The act, and a later revision by presidential decree, also provided a subsidy 
through tax deductions to domestic employment and procurement by 
exporting firms for a five-year period. This subsidy was calculated by 
formula and did not fully compensate firms for purchasing inputs 
domestically at higher than world market prices. The incentives under the act 
were later supplemented with presidential decrees establishing export 
processing zones and bonded warehouses, and with a preferential rediscount- 
ing facility at the central bank to encourage export finance. 
The industrial incentives legislation embodied a two-pronged approach 
that would characterize Philippine industrial policy until the 1980s. The 
export promotion features of both the Industrial Incentives and Export 
Incentives Acts provided subsidy to exporters and, more importantly, 
allowed them to acquire inputs at world market prices. However, the 
adoption of these measures was in addition to, rather than instead of, policies 
that encouraged production for the domestic market. The Philippines 
retained the existing system of trade protection for domestic industry and 
supplemented it with industrial incentives and, in many cases, further 
protection. Thus, industrial incentives extended the system of import 
substitution measures, while simultaneously seeking to counteract their 
discouraging effect on exports. 
Two additional features of the industrial incentives were important in the 
Philippines. Rather than an open-ended encouragement of industrial activity, 
the availability of incentives depended on industry capacity measures-what 
policymakers thought the domestic market and likely export potential could 
support. Once capacity in an industry reached that level, the industry was 
removed from the Investment Priorities Plan and no further incentives were 
given to new entrants or to expansion. In addition, in 1970 thirty industries, 
including cement and textiles, were designated as overcrowded, and neither 
new investment nor expansion could take place in these industries without 
B01 approval. lo 
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This focus on capacity carried over to the design and implementation of 
the incentives themselves. Incentives were given for the establishment of 
firms and new capacity, rather than for the profitable operation of these 
firms. Although the legislation included some incentives for expansion and 
replacement, these were deemphasized in favor of new investment. And 
once firms were established, the incentive system and restrictions on 
investment and entry tended to protect them from competition. 
The second feature of the industrial incentives was their effect in 
encouraging the use of capital. The most important of the incentives were 
duty exemptions on imported capital equipment and accelerated depreciation 
of investment, both of which lowered the cost of capital to participating 
firms. The capital-cheapening effect of the full range of BOI incentives has 
been estimated to have been between 39 and 42 percent." In addition, firms 
that were registered with the BOI had preferred access to low interest rate 
funds from state financial institutions, which further reduced their cost of 
employing capital. 
The bias toward capital intensity was also a characteristic of the drafting 
of the Investment Priorities Plan and the implementation of the incentives 
program. In the 1970s, Philippine policymakers decided on a strategy of 
industrial deepening, encouraging the development of domestic industrial 
intermediates producers and, later, capital equipment producers. The 
largest industrial recipients of BOI incentives during the 1970s were copper 
smelting and refining (36 percent of total benefits in 1977), pulp and paper, 
chemicals and chemical products, and synthetic textile fibers. Intermediate 
industries are in general capital intensive, and of the total distribution of 
industrial and export incentives, almost two-thirds went to industries with 
above average capital intensity (World Bank 1980, 31 -32). 
Two additional programs followed this strategy of industrial deepening. 
The first was the Progressive Manufacturing Program (PMP), which was 
originally adopted for automobiles in the mid-1970s and later extended to 
trucks, motorcycles, and consumer electronics. The PMP was designed to 
force the use of locally manufactured intermediates by progressively 
reducing the allocation of foreign exchange for imports. In exchange, 
participating firms received protection from foreign competition and from 
new domestic entrants. Despite the small size of the Philippine domestic 
market, each program attracted a number of participants, five for auto- 
mobiles and nine for the truck program.13 The second program was the 
Major Industrial Projects (MIPS), described in the previous chapter on 
government expenditure. 
Evaluating the overall importance of the industrial incentives is a difficult 
task. In aggregate they were relatively small, amounting to about 0.6 percent 
of GNP in 1978 and 0.8 percent in 1985. The incentives were heavily 
concentrated in manufacturing, where they were about 3 percent of value 
added and 10 percent of profits. However, for individual firms the incentives 
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were often quite large and important. A survey of 164 BOI registered firms 
in 1985 found that BOI incentives represented 30 percent of value added and 
100 percent for firms in the metal products industry.14 In addition, the BOI 
provided subsidy without expenditure in a variety of ways. As mentioned 
above, BOI incentives were often supplemented by access to low cost funds 
from state financial institutions. In addition, many of the nontariff barriers 
that were introduced during the 1970s were designed to protect registered 
firms in the industrial incentives programs and were administered by the 
BOI. 
3.3 Reform in the 1980s 
After years of analysis and growing criticism, both within and outside the 
Philippines, the system of trade protection and industrial incentives began to 
change in the early 1980s. Under the first World Bank structural adjustment 
loan (SAL), the Philippines agreed to a tariff reform and import 
liberalization program. The tariff reform program called for a substantial 
reduction in rates, as well as a more uniform structure of tariffs, to be phased 
in between 1981 and 1985. In tandem with the tariff reform, the Philippines 
agreed to an import liberalization program designed to eliminate licensing 
requirements for imports of most consumer goods, as well as some 
intermediate and capital goods. 
The tariff reform program was completed on schedule and changed the 
character of Philippine tariff protection substantially. The average tariff rate 
declined from 42 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1985.15 The effective rate 
of protection for manufacturing declined from 4 4  percent in the 1974 tariff 
system to 36 percent in 1985 (see table 3.5). The disparity in effective rates 
of protection among exports, import-competing manufactures, and import- 
noncompeting manufactures was reduced. However, the data also indicate 
that the gap between the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and mining) 
and the manufacturing sector widened because of the more than proportion- 
ate decline in the average effective rate of protection for the primary sector. 
In contrast to the tariff reform program, import liberalization proceeded 
much more fitfully. Firms whose products were removed from import 
licensing requirements in many cases appealed successfully to President 
Marcos, who later issued presidential decrees reestablishing import control 
for many products that had been removed from the list. By 1986 the 
Philippines had made little or no progress on import liberalization. 
The Philippine government also agreed to reforms in its investment 
incentives program under the two SALs. The Investment Incentives Act of 
1983 eliminated a number of benefits that were based on the use of capital 
and substituted instead tax credits based on value added and net local 
content. As a result, the capital-cheapening effect of the incentives program 
was substantially reduced. 
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These changes in trade and industrial policy came late in the game for the 
Philippines and were quickly superceded by other events. The tariff 
reduction program was partially reversed by import surcharges that were 
imposed starting in 1982 for balance of payments purposes. After the debt 
moratorium in October 1983, the Philippines reverted to foreign exchange 
allocation, effectively establishing the same system of protection by degree 
of essentiality that had long characterized Philippine policy. And in a more 
fundamental sense, the Philippine attempt to even the balance of incentives 
across industries was overshadowed by growing exchange rate overvaluation 
in the early 1980s, a subject to which we now turn. 
3.4 Exchange Rate Policy 
The history of Philippine exchange rate policy is characterized by con- 
sistently delayed responses to overvaluation, followed by large, discrete 
changes in the exchange rate. In almost every case, devaluation came after the 
emergence of a balance of payments crisis, and often required substantial 
external pressure. As a result, the Philippines has failed to achieve a real 
exchange rate that was both stable and at a level that encouraged the 
development of Philippine exports and profitable import substitution. Despite 
a much higher wartime inflation than in the United States, the Philippines 
maintained its pre-World War I1 exchange rate after independence. The 
government responded to the payments crisis in 1949 by imposing import and 
foreign exchange controls during the 1950% and pursued a conservative 
monetary and fiscal policy that resulted in a level consumer price index for the 
decade of the 1950s. The peso was devalued in 1962 as part of a decontrol 
program which was brought about by balance of payments difficulties and 
stagnating economic growth at the end of the 1950s. This marked the first 
Philippine devaluation since 1903. 
Expansionary monetary and fiscal policy during the last half of the 1960s 
led to a balance of payments crisis in 1969-70. In response, the government 
initially imposed foreign exchange rationing; eventually, the peso was floated 
in 1970 and it subsequently depreciated by 51 percent. The Philippines 
officially followed a managed float during the 1970s, in which the 
government would intervene in the foreign exchange market solely to 
smooth out fluctuations around the trend. However, except for a 7 percent 
depreciation in 1975, the changes in the peso-dollar rate were very slight and 
averaged only a 1.6 percent annual rate of depreciation between 1973 and 
1980. 
Under pressure from a widening current account deficit in the 1980s, and 
increasing difficulties in raising external funds, the Philippines began gradual 
devaluations of the currency: 5.2 percent in 198 1 and 8.1 percent in 1982. In 
the crisis year 1983 there were much larger depreciations and a fall in the 
peso exchange rate from P. 9.2 per dollar at the end of 1982 to P. 19.8 per 
dollar at the end of 1984. 
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It is of course the real, and not the nominal, exchange rate that governs 
allocation of resources. The decontrol and 1962 devaluation produced a 
substantial real depreciation that was gradually eroded, but only partly 
reversed, in the 1960s. During the 1970s and early 1980s the Philippines 
experienced a number of large changes in relative prices, making a description 
of the course of “the” real exchange rate difficult. Table 3.7 presents several 
relevant definitions of the real exchange rate over this period. 
Although the series in table 3.7 vary, they tell a roughly similar story. The 
devaluation of 1970 created a significant depreciation of the real exchange 
rate that was extended by the international commodity price boom between 
Table 3.7 Philippines Relative Price Indexes 
fTradedi REER Export REER Asian Terms of PExportsi Manufacturing 
PNontraded Markets Competitors Trade PGDP Real Wage 
Year ( 1 )  (2) (3) (4) ( 5 )  (6) 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
85 
88 
92 
97 
100 
100 
110 
115 
112 
107 
I05 
102 
101 
97 
93 
91 
93 
103 
98 
92 
90 
73 
73 
74 
109 
107 
100 
I08 
96 
I04 
I02 
101 
I08 
101 
99 
96 
91 
109 
109 
96 
I I7 
123 
79 
80 
82 
I l l  
I06 
100 
108 
I 0 0  
I07 
104 
101 
104 
97 
92 
93 
93 
109 
I09 
93 
100 
102 
~~ 
127 
123 
121 
1 I9 
I l l  
100 
I I3 
115 
88 
78 
71 
78 
82 
69 
60 
59 
61 
60 
56 
60 
65 
94 
95 
90 
118 
109 
100 
I25 
159 
I25 
I02 
95 
98 
I05 
96 
90 
74 
91 
101 
83 
88 
91 
N.A. 
I08 
I07 
I03 
105 
100 
87 
77 
86 
81 
86 
85 
85 
91 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
Notes: N.A. = not available. 
(1)  Traded goods prices are a weighted average of gross value added deflators for agriculture and forestry, 
mining, and tradable manufactures. Nontraded prices are a weighted average of deflators for 
construction, electricity and gas, and services. Weights are 1972 value addeds. 
(2) REER is real effective exchange rate. Dollar wholesale prices in major Philippine markets divided by 
dollar prices in the Philippines. Markets are the U S . .  Japan, Germany, Netherlands, and Korea. 
Increase i s  real depreciation. 
(3) REER is real effective exchange rate. Weighted average of consumer price indexes in dollars in Korea, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, divided by Philippine CPI in dollars. Weights are 1980 
exports. Increase is real depreciation. 
(4) Export unit value divided by import unit value. 
( 5 )  Gross value added deflators from national accounts. 
(6) Basic manufacturing wage divided by GDP deflator. Wage series discontinued in 1981. 
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1972 and 1974. After 1974 there is a gradual fall in the competitiveness of 
Philippine traded goods production, one that shows up most heavily in the 
commodity-price-dominated relative price of exports in column (4). What 
stands out from the table is the fact that the real exchange rate did not 
increase sharply during most of the 1970s, despite the rapid domestic 
economic growth and the high rate of foreign borrowing during this period. 
The reason that the Philippines avoided the significant currency overvalua- 
tion that characterized many of the LDC borrowers is that the external 
borrowing was accompanied by an equivalent rise in investment expenditure, 
the equipment portion of which was almost entirely imported. Therefore, the 
domestic demand impact of the increase in Philippine expenditure was 
smaller than in other LDCS. ’~  
The real appreciation that occurred in the Philippines occurred relatively 
late, in the period after 1979, with a sharp appreciation of the real exchange 
rate measures in the three years to 1982. This was the period in which a 
variety of events raised the domestic inflation rate-the unsuccessful attempt 
at economic stimulus in 1980 and 1981 and the domestic financial crisis in 
early 1981. The real appreciation of the peso also coincides with the 
recovery of the U.S. dollar from its 1978 trough. Since the Philippines 
maintained an almost stable exchange rate with the dollar, the peso in large 
part followed the course of the U.S. real exchange rate. 
While the swings in the real exchange rate are not dramatic, what is 
striking from the table is the secular fall in two important measures. The first 
is the substantial drop in real wages, starting with the 1970 stabilization 
episode and continuing through the decade. Philippine wage data is not 
particularly accurate, but the fall in real wages is difficult to reconcile with 
the apparent growth of real GNP during the decade.” The second and 
contrary indicator is the almost unbroken fall in the country’s terms of trade, 
starting in the 1960s. Even at their peak in 1974, Philippine terms of trade 
were below their 1969 level; by 1981, Philippine terms of trade had declined 
by 50 percent. Thus, the backdrop against which these real exchange rate 
changes took place increases their importance. With the kind of adjustments 
the Philippine economy was forced to make, the real appreciation that took 
place after 1979 was a major blunder. 
A number of reasons explain the tendency of the Philippine government to 
delay exchange rate adjustments to payments imbalances during the post- 
World War I1 period. The decision to maintain the prewar exchange rate was 
in fact out of Philippine hands; the country had agreed to forgo exchange rate 
changes without the approval of the United States, in exchange for U.S. war 
rehabilitation funds. The historical precedent of having maintained a fixed 
exchange rate from the beginning of the century until 1962 may have also 
created a reluctance to devalue. 
But two other reasons played the more important role in Philippine 
reluctance to adjust the exchange rate until external payments crisis made it 
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inevitable. The first was the identification in the minds of Philippine 
policymakers of the exchange rate as a nominal magnitude associated with 
domestic inflation, but not with the allocation of resources (at least outside of 
agriculture) nor with the development of new industries. The second reason 
was the development of a strong domestic constituency opposed to 
devaluation, and the failure to develop a constituency for devaluation that 
was both influential and legitimate. 
With a constant exchange rate and conservative macroeconomic policy the 
Philippines achieved a nearly stable price level during the 1950s. When the 
peso was devalued in 1962, the increase in earnings from sugar and coconuts 
led to a shift of land away from food crops, resulting in higher domestic food 
prices and a higher rate of inflation. The domestic inflation rate subsided in 
the late 1960s, despite expansionary policy, in part due to the increase in rice 
yields from the development of new high yield varieties. In the early 1970s, 
the combination of devaluation, higher external prices for export crops and 
rice, and extremely bad weather in 1972 was responsible for the acceleration 
of inflation. 
The link between exchange rate changes and domestic food prices, both 
through direct import costs and the diversion of land into export crops, was 
viewed as the key determinant of domestic inflation in the Philippines by the 
middle 1970s, both in the minds of policymakers and in analysis of price 
change in the Phi1ippines.l8 This has led both to a reluctance to devalue and, 
when devaluation took place, to taxation of export producers, often used as a 
way of funding domestic price stabilization schemes. In addition, the lack of 
development of new manufacturing export industries during the early 1960s 
created a skepticism about the ability of exchange rate changes to create new 
traded goods industries. 
Perhaps most important for describing exchange rate policy in the 
Philippines was the lack of a strong domestic voice arguing in favor of lower 
exchange rates and the avoidance of overvaluation. In the first decades after 
independence, those who would benefit from devaluation had little public 
legitimacy. Devaluation would have further increased the income and 
political power of the sugar interests, who were resented by many Filipinos 
for their ostentatious life style, and who already benefitted from the U.S. 
sugar quota premium and the Bell Act proscription on export taxes. 
Similarly, the perceived existence of foreigners in agricultural trading made a 
peso devaluation (which was thought to benefit the foreign traders more than 
the farmers) inconsistent with the nationalist, pro-Filipino aspirations of the 
time. 
By the 1970s, the sugar bloc, the most important pressure group among 
the traditional exporting industries, had declined in political and economic 
power because of the termination of the U.S. sugar quota in the early 1970s 
and the increased control of the industry by the government and its appointed 
sugar administrator, Eduardo Cojuangco. The nontraditional garment and 
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semiconductor exports were growing so fast during the 1970s that the 
exchange rate did not appear to be a critical bottleneck. In addition, investors 
in these industries were either foreign or new domestic industrialists without 
a significant power base. The only group which consistently called for a 
more realistic exchange rate during the decade was a small group of 
government technocrats and academics, as well as the multilateral agencies, 
and their voice did not carry sufficient weight in domestic politics. 
The establishment of import-substituting industries in the 1950s led to the 
emergence of an important pressure group that was opposed to peso 
devaluations. With heavy tariff and nontariff protection, the output of many 
industries became essentially nontraded, and peso devaluation would have 
lowered the prices of these goods relative to tradables. Because their 
imported raw materials and machinery were fully traded, with complete 
pass-through of exchange rate changes, a peso devaluation would have 
resulted in a profit squeeze for these industries. This is what had happened in 
1962; manufacturing profits in general, and especially those of industries 
highly favored by the 1950s control system, declined substantially with 
decontrol and peso devaluation (Power and Sicat 1971, 43). 
As a result, the potential of the exchange rate in shifting resources, 
developing new industries, and spurring adjustment was never exploited. In 
the 1970s and especially the early 1980s, the Philippines allowed a real 
appreciation of the peso, despite external signals that a major devaluation 
was in order. Philippine trade and exchange rate policy never addressed the 
problem raised by the substantial secular deterioration in the country’s terms 
of trade and its buildup of external debt. 
3.5 The Structure of Philippine Industry 
We turn now from a discussion of policy to outcomes. Trade policy and 
the structure of incentives since the 1950s encouraged the establishment of a 
largely import-substituting manufacturing sector. Import substitution was 
concentrated in consumer goods during the 1950s. As a result, the share of 
consumer imports to total imports declined from 37 percent in 1949 to about 
23 percent during the early 1950s, and dropped further to about 14 percent 
by 1960 (Power and Sicat 1971, 39). 
Table 3.8 presents the ratio of imports to domestic supply in selected 
manufacturing industries. The table indicates that domestic substitution of 
food imports was largely completed during the 1950s. Import controls also 
accelerated import substitution in wearing apparel, and publishing and 
printing. Among producer goods, import controls led to the substitution of 
domestic production for imports of textiles, paper and paper products, and 
nonmetallic mineral products during the 1950s. 
The pace of import substitution slackened during the 1960s, particularly 
for intermediate goods industries such as textiles and basic metals. This 
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Table 3.8 
Industry 1948i49 1961 I969 1974 1979 1983 
Share of Imports in Domestic Supply (percentages) 
Food manufactures 
Dairy products 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
Paper & paper products 
Publishing & printing 
Rubber 
Basic industrial chemicals 
Other chemicals 
Petroleum & coal products 
Cement 
Other nonmetallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Fabricated metal products 
Nonelectnual machinery 
Electrical machinery 
Transport equipment 
32 
86 
32 
98 
35 
N.A. 
90 
N.A. 
63 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
b 
9 
46 
13 
49 
10 
11 
33 
24 
21 
54 
31 
75 
51 
62 
b 
N.A 
45 
40 
3 
34 
14 
13 
70 
28 
6 
14 
20 
52 
28 
84 
52 
57 
N.A. N.A 
39 21 
23 18 
1 0 
25 23 
I 1  12 
15 12 
80 58 
37 22 
6 12 
I I 
23 15 
51 37 
28 19 
84 70 
45 55 
59 52 
2 
26 
22 
2 
27 
10 
25 
57 
20 
10 
0 
10 
30 
30 
50 
56 
48 
Source: NEDA, Philippine Inpur-Ourpur Tables. various years. Data for 1948149 from Baldwin (1975) 
Nore: N.A. = not available. 
"Included in food manufacturing. 
bIncluded in basic industrial chemicals. 
'Included in cement. 
reflects the impact of the import decontrol and peso devaluation, which 
increased potential product competition from abroad at the same time that 
(imported) input costs increased. Import substitution picked up again during 
the 1970s, particularly for textiles, basic metals, and fabricated metal 
products. This second round of import substitution was the result of the 
increased use of nontariff barriers. Nontariff barriers specifically for the 
purpose of industry protection were imposed on imports of textile fabrics, 
synthetic yams, fibers and paper board products, synthetic resins, and liquid 
caustic soda among others. 
What is clear from table 3.8 is the extent to which the import substitution 
strategy has dominated the development of Philippine industry. Some sectors 
have progressed farther than others in replacing imports with domestic 
production, but by 1983 domestic output provided more than 40 percent of 
domestic supply in all sectors listed, and 70 percent or more in most. This 
across-the-board representation of Philippine industry carries on within 
individual industries. For example, Philippine textile plants are unspecial- 
ized, integrated operations, designed to serve the full range of domestic 
market demand. This lack of specialization and the relatively small 
Philippine market has meant higher costs and, in the case of textiles, lower 
quality and a higher yam fault rate. l9 
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3.6 Growth of Exports 
In contrast to the broad range of production for the domestic market, 
exports have been much more concentrated within certain industries, as is 
evident from table 3.9. The vast majority of Philippine manufactured exports 
have depended either on domestic natural resources (wood products, 
furniture, and within chemicals, coconut oil) or labor-intensive manufactured 
exports within apparel and electrical machinery. 
Philippine merchandise exports, broken down into major commodities, 
are shown in table 3.10. As is clear from the table, export earnings hit a 
peak in 1980 when favorable crop yields coincided with high international 
prices, but then declined into the 1980s. The share of merchandise exports in 
GDP shows an uneven pattern, as it was affected by real exchange rate 
changes and changes in the terms of trade, but little change over the entire 
period. 
Behind the merchandise export total are two divergent trends. There was 
an extremely rapid growth in exports of manufactured products after 1972, 
in both nominal and real terms. In contrast, the growth of earnings from the 
traditional export sector was more sluggish, and total dollar earnings 
Table 3.9 Ratio of Exports to Total Output 
Industry 1961 1969 1914 I979 1983 
Other food manufactures 
Beverages 
Tobacco manufactures 
Textile 
Wearing apparel 
Leather & leather products 
Lumber, plywood & veneer 
Other wood products 
Furniture & fixtures 
Paper & paper products 
Rubber & plastic products 
Basic industrial chemicals 
Other chemical products 
Petroleum & coal products 
Cement 
Other nonmetallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Fabricated metal products 
Nonelectrical machinery 
Electrical machinery & parts 
Transport equipment 
N.A. 
0.2 
4.5 
2.0 
0.0 
13.0 
0.9 
- 
7.2 
b 
N.A. 
1.2 
5.5 
I .5 
18.7 
15.5 
43.9 
3.9 
1.7 
1.4 
6.3 
2.2 
7.1 
1.7 
1.1 
8.3 
0.6 
1.8 
2.5 
2. I 
- 
8.5 
1.3 
1.0 
6.1 
9.3 
11.1 
27.5 
N.A. 
34.0 
2.8 
1 .o 
6.1 
I .6 
1.2 
21.2 
7.4 
6.7 
0.6 
4.0 
1.7 
0.3 
15.1 
0.4 
0. I 
12.9 
29.3 
54.6 
35.8 
58.9 
32.8 
1.7 
4.2 
24.0 
2.1 
I .6 
5.2 
5.3 
11.7 
1.9 
2.9 
51.1 
4.5 
12.9 
1.1 
0. I 
15.3 
37.0 
54.9 
26.6 
20. I 
52.3 
3.4 
2.9 
13.9 
2.4 
4. I 
1.6 
4.1 
2.6 
16.2 
3.1 
70.4 
5.8 
Source: NEDA, Philippine Inpur-Ourpur Tables, 1961, 1969. 1974, 1979, and 1983. 
Note. N.A. means data were not available, and a dash indicates the amount was negligible. 
"Is included in lumber, plywood & veneer. 
bIs included in basic industrial chemicals. 
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declined sharply after 1980. The combination of both of these factors was 
responsible for the marked shift in the structure of Philippine exports in the 
1970s and continuing into the 1980s. 
The rapid growth of nontraditional manufactures exports appears to 
confirm the success of the Philippine strategy of export promotion, and was 
one of the primary reasons for the optimism concerning the Philippine 
economy among international agencies and commercial banks during the 
1970s. Several factors were behind this rapid export growth. The first was 
the provision of investment incentives and incentives for domestic value 
added contained in the Industrial Incentives Act of 1967, the Export 
Incentives Act of 1970, and later amendments to these two acts. While not 
unimportant, the effect of the direct incentives to export was relatively 
small. A World Bank mission calculated the value of export incentives as 
constituting between 3 and 9 percent of the exports of registered firms 
between 1973 and 1977.20 A later estimate put the effect of the incentives 
for domestic employment and procurement at between 5 and 10 percent of 
value added, depending on the input structure and profitability of the firm.” 
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that much of the export took 
place through bonded warehouses, which were ineligible for the incentives. 
Much more important were the provisions of these two acts, supplemented 
by the establishment of export processing zones and the authorization of 
bonded warehouses, which allowed exporters to purchase inputs at world 
market prices. It was this access to inputs, plus the changes in real exchange 
rates during the 1970s, that made the rapid growth of nontraditional exports 
possible (see table 3.7). Even more important for the kind of export 
industries that developed was the fall in real wages of approximately 25 
percent that took place in the early 1970s. By the mid-l970s, Philippine 
wages for garment workers were roughly half that of Korea and a quarter of 
those in Hong Kong.22 
Philippine manufactured exports are highly concentrated in a few 
products. Electrical components and garments together make up about 60 
percent of the total of manufactured exports. Within electrical components, 
exports are concentrated in the assembly of semiconductor devices and 
microcircuits, and within garments, on finishing of consigned imports of 
women’s wear and garments for infants and children. Each industry depends 
heavily on imported inputs. Estimates of domestic value added vary, but are 
about 25 percent for garments and 15 percent for electronic components. 
These ratios appear to have remained constant in the Philippines, unlike 
other less developed country exporters which have succeeded in raising their 
value-added margin through subcontracting. 
The weak performance of traditional export commodities counteracted the 
rise in manufactured exports. The growth in export receipts from the 
traditional commodity export sector during the 1970s was entirely due to 
inflation; a quantity index formed using 1978 weights varies over the decade, 
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but ends up at the same level in 1980 as in 1972 (see table 3.10). Over the 
next four years the quantity of Philippine traditional exports declined by 39 
percent, with a little over half of the decline coming in 1984. The 
importance of the stagnation and decline of the traditional export sector is 
hard to overstate; had the quantity of these exports grown at the same rate as 
real GDP and all other things remained equal, Philippine exports would have 
been 53 percent, or $2.8 billion higher in 1984. 
There are various explanations for the poor performance of the traditional 
export sector. The Philippines was hit by the low growth in international 
demand for commodities after the first oil shock and the accompanying 
weakness in their prices. Two features peculiar to the Philippines were also 
responsible for reductions in export quantity. At the beginning of the 1970s, 
exports of forest products, mainly logs, made up a quarter of Philippine 
traditional exports. However, the deforestation that had occurred in the 
Philippines led to increased concern for conservation and increasingly severe 
restrictions on log exports. By 1980, recorded log exports had dropped by 
90 percent. 23 
The second feature is the dependence of Philippine sugar exports on U.S. 
quota allocations. The Philippines is a higher than average cost producer of 
sugar, and historically almost all Philippine exports have gone to the United 
States under quota. High sugar prices and the dismantling of the U.S. sugar 
quota in the 1970s led to a diversification of destinations, but the importance 
of the U.S. market was reestablished with the reinstitution of U.S. import 
quotas in 1981. And, as total U.S. imports have been reduced in the 1980s, 
Philippine exports have been correspondingly squeezed. 
But much of the responsibility for the performance of the traditional 
export sector must be laid to Philippine policies. Philippine trade policy has 
consistently discriminated against the sector, promoting import-substituting 
manufacturing and then nontraditional export products. As a consequence, 
the commodity export sector has suffered negative effective protection, as 
outlined above. The 1970s saw the institution of additional policies that 
discriminated against traditional exports. After the 1970 devaluation of the 
peso, Philippine authorities introduced taxes of 4 to 10 percent on most 
commodity exports. Although supposedly temporary, these measures were 
never repealed and became a permanent feature of martial law policy.24 
Coconuts, the most important of the traditional products, had the largest 
taxation. A levy on the first sale of copra was introduced in 1973, initially to 
finance a price stabilization fund for domestic coconut products, but later to 
support a Coconut Industry Development Fund. The amount of the levy 
varied somewhat over the next ten years, but averaged about 20 percent of 
the export price, and eventually exceeded 30 percent. 
Thus, at a time when world prices were turning against commodity 
producers, the Philippines raised the effective taxation of the commodity 
sector. Beyond this, government and quasi-governmental intervention 
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increased dramatically during the martial law period in the most important 
sectors, coconuts and sugar. By the end of the decade, each was under the 
control of a Marcos crony, who had a monoply over purchases from the 
industry. These interventions are described in more detail in the following 
chapter, but the siphoning off of rents from sugar and coconuts, in addition 
to the taxes that were collected, further weakened the incentives for 
producers in those industries. 
We are now in a position to answer one of the questions posed at the 
beginning of this chapter, that is, why there was such a sluggish performance 
of exports relative to gross domestic product, while at the same time there 
was a dramatic change in the structure of Philippine exports and a rapid 
growth in exports of manufactures. Behind this lay the fact that Philippine 
export promotion had a very narrow base. What Philippine export promotion 
measures did was allow producers to obtain imported inputs at world market 
prices, leading to the development of export reprocessing based on imported 
materials and the low wages of Philippine labor. The retention and 
augmentation of the system of protection for manufacturing firms producing 
for the domestic market meant that value-added margins of these export 
producers would stay very thin; the higher cost and lower quality of domestic 
materials precluded the growth of domestic sourcing. The high degree of 
protection of the domestic market also tended to limit export products to 
industries where materials transport costs were low and labor input 
requirements high. Garments and electronic components fit  those require- 
ments perfectly, and export growth was highly concentrated in these two 
sectors. Thus, Philippine export growth was intensive rather than extensive. 
The rapid transformation of the structure of Philippine exports is 
misleading since it was based as much on the low growth of traditional 
export products as it was on the rapid growth of nontraditional exports. 
Unfavorable external conditions were partly responsible, but these were 
greatly exacerbated by Philippine policies which explicitly and implicitly 
taxed the traditional sector. The rapid shift in export structure, propelled 
from both ends, resulted in the narrowing of the value-added base of the 
country’s exports since the domestic content of the nontraditional manufac- 
tures was much lower than that of Philippine agricultural and mineral 
commodities. Thus, as exports of manufactured goods expanded, imports of 
materials increased pari passu. The resulting structure was one in which a 
greater increase in gross exports was necessary to generate a net increase in 
foreign exchange earnings when external funding faltered. 
3.7 Trade Policy and Manufacturing Performance 
The remaining question raised at the beginning of this chapter concerns the 
weak performance of Philippine manufacturing in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Productivity growth for the sector as a whole was negative throughout the 
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1970s, with a particularly sharp fall after 1975. Employment generation was 
also low, despite the growth of labor-intensive manufactured exports. Finally, 
the growth rate of manufacturing output started to decline after 1977 and 
largely collapsed in the 1980s, again despite the continued growth of manu- 
factured exports. 
As described above, Philippine trade policy continued to protect the 
domestic manufacturing sector during the 1970s through existing tariffs and 
an increasing use of nontariff barriers, despite the adoption of export 
promotion. The domestic manufacturing sector remained closed to foreign 
competition, as well as being insulated from the exporting segment of the 
industry. As a result, the growth of the sector was largely determined by 
domestic demand and by industrial incentives policy. 
The industrial policy that was in fact adopted by the Philippine authorities 
encouraged the development of intermediate industries as a part of a process 
of industrial deepening. This policy thrust was reinforced by the shift in 
domestic demand toward investment and the particularly rapid growth of 
construction, activities with an especially high demand for materials. The 
outcome was a pronounced shift in manufacturing output growth toward 
intermediate industries, as well as capital goods, during the last half of the 
1970s (table 3.11). 
Table 3.11 Growth Rates of Real Manufacturing Production 
(in percentage change per year) 
1970-75 1975-80 
Fastest growing 
Beverages 
Machinery 
Plastics 
Apparel 
Furniture 
Food 
23.0 Nonferrous metals 32.9 
23.0 Industrial chemicals 28. I 
22.2 Footwear 27.6 
16.3 Paper products 23.7 
14.5 Wood products 21.9 
13.3 Glass 21.3 
Transport equipment 21.2 
Total manufacturing 6.8 5.4 
Consumer goods 13.1 2. I 
Intermediates 3.3 9.5 
Capital goods 6.2 12.4 
Food 13.3 I .2 
Petroleum products 10.8 - 2.0 
Other K-intensive" 6.8 13.8 
L-intensiveb 8.8 7.3 
Memo items: 
Source: Hooley (1985). using data from the annual surveys of manufacturing adjusted to reflect firms with 
twenty or more workers. 
Nore: Growth rates are valued at 1972 prices. 
'Capital-intensive industries include paper, chemicals. nonmetallic minerals, glass, iron and steel. and 
nonferrous metals. 
bLabor-intensive industries are the remaining industries, except food and petroleum products 
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As is clear from table 3.11, output growth was also concentrated in 
industries with above average capital intensity. This was partly the result of 
the shift in demand toward intermediates, described above, as well as the 
nature of industrial incentives and government-sponsored finance, which 
lowered the cost of capital. Again, this took place despite the rapid growth 
of labor-intensive manufactured exports. The shift toward capital-intensive 
industries provides an explanation for the low growth payout of Philippine 
investment (or, alternately, the country’s high ICOR) since capital-intensive 
industries require more investment per unit of output. In addition, the shift 
toward these industries helps explain the low employment generation of 
Philippine manufacturing. 
Shifts in the industry composition of manufacturing output also lie behind 
much of the poor productivity performance of Philippine manufacturing. 
During the 1970s, most manufacturing industries registered positive total 
factor productivity growth. For the decade as a whole, within industry 
productivity growth added 0.34 percent per year to total factor productivity 
in manufacturing, while interindustry shifts lowered manufacturing produc- 
tivity by 1.57 percent per year.25 
Other factors lay behind the poor performance of the manufacturing 
sector. During the martial law period there was increasing government 
intervention in the industry, as well as increased activity by publicly owned 
corporations. From 1965 to 1980 the share of government corporations in 
total assets of nonfinancial corporations doubled to 27 percent (Hooley 1985, 
28).26 The importance of this in explaining the low productivity growth of 
the sector has been stressed by Hooley, who found total factor productivity 
in government corporations to be only 56 percent of that of privately owned 
corporations (29-30). In addition to direct government intervention, firms 
owned by Marcos associates played an increasing role in domestic activity, 
largely through acquisition. The impact of government intervention and 
crony capitalism is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, in which we 
argue that both played a role in the deteriorating performance of domestic 
industry. 
Trade, exchange rate, and incentives policies played a crucial role in the 
slide of the Philippines toward debt crisis. Although deceptively successful 
in developing manufactured exports and shifting total export composition, 
Philippine policy failed to respond to the worsening external environment 
and the country’s foreign debt accumulation. The depletion of forestry 
resources and the secular decline in the terms of trade should have led to a 
real exchange rate depreciation that would have provided across-the-board 
encouragement to exports and efficient import substitution. Instead the 
Philippines allowed a gradual appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
encouraged manufactured exports while maintaining and strengthening the 
protection of domestic industry, and increasingly taxed the traditional export 
sector. The result was a significant hollowing of the country’s export base, 
greatly reducing its foreign exchange earning capacity. 
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The combination of trade protection, investment incentives, and domestic 
growth propelled by investment and construction took its toll on Philippine 
industry. Output shifted toward more capital-intensive, lower productivity 
industries, limiting the growth that the Philippines got out of its investment 
and foreign borrowing. But these industries were also dependent on the 
continued momentum of borrowing and investment and proved extremely 
vulnerable to the recession of the early 1980s. The sharp declines in many of 
these industries worsened the recession in the early 1980s, and many of these 
firms ended up in the hands of the government, either through rescue 
operations or the assumption of guaranteed external loan obligations. 
4 Government Interventions and 
Rent Seeking 
In the popular imagination the legacy of the Marcos administration was the 
accumulation of vast wealth by Ferdinand Marcos, his family members, and 
various individuals, or “cronies,” who were closely associated with him. 
Corruption and the accumulation of wealth through government did not 
originate with Marcos, nor was it unusual in the Philippines as opposed to 
other countries in or outside the region. But the scale on which corruption 
and the generation of rents took place in the Philippines under Marcos was at 
a qualitatively different level. What observers in the Philippines referred to 
as crony capitalism, and what less charitable observers outside the country 
referred to as “government by kleptocracy,” was of such a scale as to have 
macroeconomic consequences, and plays its own important role in the slide 
of the Philippines into crisis. 
The use of government power to generate and distribute wealth, what 
economists have termed “government rent seeking” had three critical 
consequences. First, quasi-governmental control and monopolization of the 
two principal commodity export crops, sugar and coconuts, was responsible 
for much of the sluggish growth of traditional and total exports. Second, the 
particularistic way in which the government issued regulations and granted 
access to credit to favored firms and the way in which crony business 
empires were built weakened and demoralized the private, nonassociated 
business sector and encouraged capital flight. Finally, when the crony 
empires dissolved in the 1980s, the government was left with a huge burden 
of failed assets, called loan guarantees, and unmet domestic payment 
obligations, creating a fiscal problem of major dimensions. We start our 
story with two of the most insidious interventions, those in sugar and 
coconuts. 
